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Abstract 
Past research on offshore information systems development (ISD) has found control theory to be a 
useful perspective for examining the co-ordination between the client and the vendor. Control 
literature describes two primary control modes viz. formal and informal control modes, classified as 
behavior, outcome, clan and self-control modes. But most control literature focuses either on the 
conditions for adopting a particular control mode or the influence of the chosen control mode(s) on 
relationship performance. Recent research on offshore ISD has uncovered two distinct control 
mechanisms comprising each of the control modes viz. structural and process mechanisms. Structural 
control mechanism describes the ‘what’ or the structure of the control mode, whereas process control 
mechanism explains ‘how’ or the process through which the control mode is enacted. Grounding our 
arguments in the alignment literature, the study theorizes the need for alignment between the control 
‘structures’ and ‘processes’ within each of the control modes for effective contract performance. In 
effect, we posit the moderating role of control processes on the relationship between control 
structures and contract performance. In this research-in- progress paper, we perform a preliminary 
test on the theorized model, through data collected from a field study comprising offshore ISD 
projects executed by Indian vendors. Initial results indicate support for the ‘alignment’ argument. In 
future, we intend to do detailed theorizing, and ultimately test the model for different dependent 
variables, thereby contributing to the literature on alignment and control theory for offshore ISD.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In an offshore information systems development (ISD) scenario, managing the relationship between 
the client and the vendor has often been recognized as one of the key concerns for better performance. 
Control theory has often been invoked to explain the co-ordination between clients and vendors, and 
organizations employ a variety of control modes for achieving this. Control is defined as a set of 
systems and procedures designed to motivate performance to attain the desired objectives (Kirsch 
1996; Kirsch et al. 2002). It is through the exercise of control that clients can motivate vendors to 
deliver applications that meet the clients’ specific requirements and are of value to them. Despite 
significant research in the area, the relationship between control modes and offshore ISD performance 
has still not been completely understood (Tiwana 2010). One of the major reasons for this is the fact 
that until recently each of the control modes were conceptualized as an integral entity. This implies 
that though the control literature distinguished among different control modes (e.g. formal and 
informal control modes - outcome control and behavior control being formal modes; clan control and 
self-control being informal modes) (Kirsch, 1996), it did not explicitly describe control mechanisms 
acting within each of the different control modes. Control mechanisms are the ways in which each of 
the different control modes are enacted, i.e., ‘what’ and ‘how’ control modes operate. Often the 
description of control modes subsumes the underlying control mechanisms, i.e., control modes depict 
not only ‘what’ is controlled (e.g., what outcomes and behaviors) but also ‘how’ it is controlled (i.e., 
the processes used to attain the desired outcomes and behaviors) (e.g. Choudhury and Sabherwal 
2003). Recent research on offshore ISD has uncovered two distinct mechanisms comprising each of 
the control modes viz. structural and process mechanisms. Structural control mechanism describes the 
‘what’ or the structure of the control mode, whereas process control mechanism explains ‘how’ or the 
process through which the control mode is enacted (Srivastava and Teo, 2012). Yet, it is unclear how 
should the control structures and processes be configured within each of the control modes for better 
performance. Through this research we intend to address this gap in control literature on offshore ISD.  
The ‘alignment’ perspective has been found to be a useful theoretical lens for explaining IS success in 
different contexts. Broadly, the alignment literature suggests that congruence between the 
organizational strategy, structures and systems leads to better organizational performance. In general, 
many studies have found evidence of the positive impact of alignment (e.g., Teo and King, 1996; 
King and Teo, 2000) though a few studies (e.g., Bergeron et al., 2004) found insignificant and mixed 
results. Hence, it would be interesting to examine the effect of alignment of control structures and 
control processes in the context of offshore contract performance. Therefore, extending the argument 
to the control theory, we posit that the control mechanisms (structures and processes) describing each 
of the control modes should also be aligned for effective performance. Hence, using Srivastava and 
Teo’s (2012) control mechanisms framework (Figure 1), we posit a superior offshore ISD 
performance when the control structures and processes are aligned within each of the control modes.  
 
So the basic research questions that we seek to examine are:- 
 
RQ 1: Does alignment between control mechanism structure and control mechanism process for 
formal control mode affect offshore ISD performance?  
 
RQ 2: Does alignment between control mechanism structure and control mechanism process for 
informal control mode affect offshore ISD performance?  
 
Please note that among informal control modes, we do not intend to examine the self control mode as 
this mode has been found to be ‘not significant’ in the context of outsourcing (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal 2003; Tiwana and Keil 2009).   
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Figure 1. Control Mechanisms acting within Different Control Modes (Srivastava and Teo, 2012) 
 
2  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
We ground our theory development and hypotheses in control and alignment literature. As discussed 
in the previous section, we see that although control literature has made huge advances, its 
applicability in the outsourced ISD is rather limited. Likewise, the relationship amongst different 
control mechanisms and their impact of performance needs deeper examination. Developing on the 
recently proposed, Srivastava and Teo (2012) framework on control mechanisms, we posit that it is 
important to examine the impact of ‘configurations of relationships’ between different control 
structures and control processes comprising various control modes (Figure 1). For the formal control 
mode, contract is the instrument that defines the control structure and the extent of specificity or 
extensiveness of the contract specifies the extent of formal structure. Mechanistic governance, on the 
other hand, describes the formal control process mechanisms, implying, following the written contract 
very closely without the need for consultation between the client and the vendor. For informal mode, 
clan control defines the role of shared vision/norms between the client and vendor as the structure, 
while relational governance as the process where consultation and communication between the client 
and vendor is more important, rather than closely following what is laid down in the written contract. 
Usually, all relationships between the client and vendor are a mix of formal and informal control 
modes. But from a theoretical standpoint, it is important to understand the relative salience of 
particular process mechanisms for implementing a particular structure. Does structure-process 
configuration make a difference in terms of contract performance? 
Prior literature on strategic alignment has established that alignment of different business entities in 
an organization, creates value for the organization by fostering a synergy (e.g. Chan and Reich, 2007; 
Sabherwal and Chan, 2001; Sabherwal et al., 2001). Hence, alignment of strategy and structure in an 
organization with the different processes leads to better performance. We extend this idea of 
alignment to the different control modes acting in the coordination between the client and the vendor 
in an offshore ISD. So, integrating ideas from control theory and alignment, we posit if the framework 
(control structure) guiding the coordination between the client and the vendor is aligned with the 
modus operandi of actual coordination between the client and vendor (control process), due to 
fostered synergies, the performance will be positively impacted. In the final paper, we plan to do a 
detailed theoretical development for each of the control modes. In summary, we expect superior 
performance for situations where the control structure is aligned with the control process, both for 
formal as well as informal control modes. Thus, we have the following two initial hypotheses:- 
 
H1: In offshore ISD for formal control mode, using mechanistic governance would enhance the 
influence of contract specificity on cost performance.  
 
H2: In offshore ISD for informal control mode, using relational governance would enhance the 
influence of shared beliefs on cost performance.  
 
3 METHOD 
3.1 Instrument and Data Collection     
We have collected initial survey data and intend using it for testing the research hypotheses. In the 
analysis below, we show how we have done the initial hypothesis testing. We chose to collect project 
level data from Indian vendors involved in ISD for offshore clients. Choice of India as the research 
location is justified by the fact that it is the leading offshore ISD vendor nation catering to nearly 60% 
of the total world requirement for offshore ISD (Lewin et al. 2005). The survey instrument was 
developed by adapting items from previous research where psychometric properties have been 
established. The survey was administered to project managers and members of the offshore ISD 
teams.  The items for the survey instrument and the construct reliabilities are indicated in Table 2. 
Data on project and performance related variable (cost performance) was collected from the project 
manager whereas data on attributes of the project team were collected from two members of each of 
the respective software development team. The responses of the two project team members were 
aggregated and analyzed in conjunction with the matched data from the project manager.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) – 7 (strongly agree) 
 
Contract Specificity  (α=0.90) (Based on Cannon et al., 2000;  Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Mooi and Ghosh, 
2010) 
CSPE1 The contract spelled out in detail the vendor’s duties, obligations and rewards. 
CSPE2 The contract clearly specified the key service level agreements (SLAs).  
CSPE3 The contract was a comprehensive document in which key exigencies have already been taken 
care of.  
CSPE4 The contract specified the penalties to which the vendor firm was liable in the event of non-
performance. 
CSPE5 The contract meticulously covered the important aspects of the vendor’s business relationship 
with the client.  
Shared Vision ( = 0.87) (Based on Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Carson et al. 2006) 
SHVI1 The vendor project team shared the same ambitions and vision with the client regarding the 
project. 
SHVI2 The vendor project team was enthusiastic about pursuing the goals and mission of the client 
collectively. 
SHVI3 The vendor project team wanted the client to fulfill their underlying business aspirations through 
the project. 
SHVI4 The vendor project team understood the client’s vision regarding the project. 
  
Mechanistic Governance (α=0.75) (Based on Krishnan et al., 2006,  Carson et al., 2006) 
MGOV1 The vendor project team members were aware of the details specified in the contract with the 
client. 
MGOV2 The vendor referred to the contract for day-to-day operations.  
MGOV3 The client expected the vendor to adhere to the contract very closely. 
  
Relational Governance (α=0.80) (Based on Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Krishnan et al., 2006, Carson et 
al., 2006) 
RGOV1 The vendor project team and the client shared helpful information to an extent beyond that 
required by formal agreements.  
RGOV2 The vendor project team and the client had mutual expectations that each would be flexible and 
responsive to the requests by the other, even if not obliged by formal agreements.  
RGOV3 The vendor project team and the client understood that each would adjust to changing 
circumstances, even if not bound to change by formal agreement.  
  
Cost Performance (α=0.73) (Based on Faraj and Sproull, 2000, Krishnan et al., 2006) 
CPER1 Financial performance of the contract.  
CPER2 Cost savings. 
CPER3 Financial performance of the project. 
Table 1: Construct Indicators and Reliabilities 
  
During the questionnaire development, we were in regular contact with three senior offshore software 
development industry executives and two senior executives at the National Association of Software 
and Services Companies (NASSCOM
1
) so as to have their constant feedback on the items and scales. 
After the initial questionnaire was ready, it was pre-tested with five senior industry executives in India 
                                                          
1
 NASSCOM is a consortium that serves as an interface to the Indian software industry and Indian BPO 
industry. 
 
(in charge of offshore software development) and their detailed feedback was incorporated in 
improving the readability and industry orientation of the items in the questionnaire. Subsequently, the 
modified questionnaire was used for first doing a pilot survey for 23 projects and subsequently, data 
were collected for 169 recently completed offshore software development projects from 8 vendors 
working for mostly US clients. All the chosen vendors had CMM level 5 certification and so were 
essentially similar in terms of their ISD work processes. In the final analysis, we included data from 
160 projects as responses on 9 projects were incomplete. 
As dependent performance variables may be influenced by factors other than those in the 
hypothesized model, we incorporated suitable controls in the regression equations for the performance 
variable (ISD cost performance) to better understand the variance explained by the research variables. 
Control variables of three different types were included in the research model to account for 
alternative explanations, namely: (1) vendor firm characteristics – seven vendor firm dummies, 
vendor firm experience with the specific client; (2) vendor employee characteristics – vendor 
employee experience with the specific client firm, total vendor employee experience; and (3) 
partnership characteristics – size of work team, type of contract (fixed price or time & material). We 
did control for these variables but due to paucity of space we are showing results only for the main 
and interaction variables. 
4 INITIAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 ISD Cost Performance 
 Step 1 Step 2 
 Main effects Interaction effects 
Contract specificity 0.345

 0.445

 
Shared Vision 0.161

 0.162

 
Mechanistic governance 0.069 0.094 
Relational governance 0.176

 0.176

 
Contract specificity X mechanistic governance  0.167

 
Contract specificity X relational governance  -0.163

 
Shared Vision X mechanistic governance   0.080 
Shared Vision X relational governance  0.123

 
   
R
2
 0.425

 0.467

 
ΔR2  0.042 
Notes: Significant figures are shown in boldface. n = 160 projects. ** p< 0.01 level; * 
p<0.05 level 
Table 2. Results of Hierarchical Regressions 
 
As seen from the initial results presented in Table 2 above, both the hypotheses (H1) (β=0.167, 
p<0.01) and (H2) (β=0.123, p<0.05) are supported. This provides support to our basic thesis that 
alignment between control structures and processes significantly impacts cost performance. In fact 
from the results above, we observe that the interaction term of contract specificity with relational 
governance is also significant but in the negative direction (β=-0.163, p<0.01). This result clearly 
brings out that a misalignment may actually be detrimental towards cost performance.  
Overall, the results provide empirical support for the importance of aligning control structures with 
control processes. As well, the results suggest that misalignment may have adverse effect on 
performance. Such results are useful to researchers as our study helps to integrate the control and 
alignment research streams. Such integration of literatures could potentially give rise to new research 
issues, thereby helping to build up a cumulative tradition in IS research. For practitioners, the results 
provide important guidelines on the need to align control structures and control processes for better 
offshore performance. In fact, the notion of misalignment may also help practitioners to explain why 
some offshore contracts fail to deliver required performance. This research represents an ongoing 
stream of projects seeking to better understand offshore contract performance; the results should 
prove insightful to researchers and practitioners in the future.   
5 CONTRIBUTIONS AND RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE 
FUTURE 
The research, when complete, is expected to contribute to three major streams of literature. First, it 
will contribute to the control literature by extending its usage in the outsourced ISD context by 
providing support to the conceptualization of control structures and control processes within each of 
the control modes (Srivastava and Teo, 2012; Tiwana and Keil, 2009; Tiwana, 2010). Second, it will 
contribute to the alignment literature by extending its applicability to the control literature. Third, it 
will contribute to the body of current knowledge in the field of offshore ISD, an area that is currently 
facing theoretical as well as practical challenges.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This is a research-in-progress paper where initial results provide support for alignment argument 
between control structures and control processes for superior performance. In future, we plan to 
further strengthen the theoretical arguments so as to theorize separately not only for formal and 
informal controls but also for other dependent variables. We then plan to test these theorized 
relationships with more dependent variables and possibly add more control variables to provide 
robustness to the results.  
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